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Strategic Insights: America's Strategic
Debate - And Why It Matters To The
Army
September 25, 2014 | Dr. Steven Metz

Since becoming a global superpower, the United States often adjusted its national
strategy. Over time, the effectiveness of any given strategy erodes. This sparks debate
about America’s appropriate role in the world, and about where, when, and why national
power should be used. From the debate, a revised approach takes shape and lasts until its
effectiveness fades. Then the cycle starts again.
Weary of the long conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and frightened by huge
government deficits, Americans once again are debating their national strategy. Both the
political right and left, Republicans and Democrats, are reevaluating the extent and form
of American involvement in maintaining global security. Within the public, the
community of security experts and Congress, the constituency for global activism and a
strong military has shattered. While it is impossible to tell where this debate will lead, one
thing is clear: it is particularly important for the Army. History is shifting, and whatever
new strategy emerges will determine the extent and form of Landpower that the United
States needs for many years.
The debate is driven by big questions about America’s role in the world. Immediately
following World War II, the United States hoped that global security would be managed
by the victorious allies, using the newly created United Nations. Once it became clear that
the Soviet Union was uninterested in cooperation, Washington accepted a leading role in
maintaining the security of what became known as the “free world.” The Army helped
prevent a conventional Soviet takeover of Western Europe and later assisted nations

facing communist insurgencies. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the
Cold War, the United States remained—in Madeleine Albright’s words—the
“indispensable nation.” With only one superpower, American involvement was vital to
security and conflict resolution everywhere.
Now elected officials, policymakers, and security experts are questioning America’s
indispensability. Calls for strategic retrenchment are growing. Its advocates favor less
military involvement in far flung regions, even when the United States wades in
diplomatically. But Americans have been down this road before. Since the end of World
War II, U.S. strategy has seen recurring cycles of retrenchment and revival.1 While it
remains to be seen whether this round of retrenchment will be followed by a later revival,
there is no doubt that the United States is decreasing its global engagement in many ways
and many places. The open question is how far and how fast this will go.
Another key question in the debate on the future of American strategy is whether the
United States should continue attempting to resolve conflicts or switch to simply
managing threats. This apparently simple issue has profound implications for the Army.
Threat management means limiting involvement in a conflict absent a direct challenge to
the United States or a close American ally. For instance, the United States might leave
Islamic extremists alone so long as they do not sponsor transnational terrorism. By
contrast, a strategy of conflict resolution commits the United States to assisting
governments fighting extremism. The idea is that these partners, once bolstered, can
address the political, economic, and ideological factors that allowed extremism to take
root. Rather than repeatedly attacking terrorists, the United States would help alter the
factors that spawn terrorism.
An American strategy aimed at conflict resolution is a relatively recent development.
Since American disengagement from Europe after World War I contributed to the rise of
Nazism and the outbreak of another world war, U.S. political leaders were determined not
to repeat the mistake. Instead they committed to sustained global engagement and
building regional security systems that addressed the weaknesses that communism
exploited. It worked: America’s global engagement played a major role in the eventual
demise of communism.
Now some national security experts and political leaders favor returning to threat
management. Often this is called “offshore balancing.” The Army has a deep stake in this
issue. It is the component of the Joint Force with the greatest capability to seize and
control territory and thus is vital for conflict resolution. Threat management—the
periodic and recurring punishment of enemies—can be done from afar. If the United
States decides that it no longer wants to pursue conflict resolution, it only needs small,
expeditionary ground forces. Pushed to extremes, the United States could make do with a

large Air Force and Navy, a Marine Corps, and no Army. This would be an extraordinarily
risky venture but, to some Americans, the cost savings make it a risk worth taking.
Another important issue in the ongoing debate over the future of American strategy
concerns red lines. Under what conditions should or must U.S. political leaders use force?
During the height of the Cold War, ideology helped answer this question: nearly every
anti-communist government facing a threat from a communist or Soviet-aligned enemy
was eligible for U.S. help. The enemy of our enemy was our friend. After the Soviet Union
collapsed, U.S. policymakers, seeing little chance that American military action would
escalate or that any enemy could bloody the United States badly, became even more
inclined to use force, deploying troops to places like Kuwait, Somalia, and the Balkans.
Today no one knows what America’s red lines are, particularly for the application of
Landpower. There are humanitarian disasters in Syria and other places; Libya and Yemen
are in chaos; Russian proxies control parts of Ukraine; and, sociopathic extremists have
declared a new “caliphate” in Iraq. Yet the use of American ground forces is not on the
table. This lack of consensus on strategic red lines is not simply an attribute of the Barack
Obama administration but reflects deeper schisms and disagreements within the
American public and the persistent hyperpoliticization of national security policy. The
Army finds it hard to plan for the long-term future since it does not know when, why, or
how political leaders might use it.
The third issue of great importance to the Army is whether America’s global strategy
should continue to focus on large-scale war between the armed forces of nations. For
several decades, U.S. political and military leaders assumed that, while major war was
unlikely, it would be the most challenging mission the military could face. If the armed
services were prepared for it, they automatically would be able to handle other, ostensibly
less challenging tasks. While sound in theory, preparing for large-scale conventional war
is always expensive. It requires capacity which is seldom, perhaps never, used and hence
is deeply inefficient. When the United States could afford inefficiency, the cost of
preparing for an improbable war was tolerable. Now it is not. That creates big problems
for the military. Money spent on big war capability is money not spent on something else
which may be more likely. But America’s political leaders have not taken big war off the
table. This means that the services must spend huge amounts for systems and equipment
they may never use instead of investing in things that are likely—even certain—to be
needed.
Depending on how the debate on the future of American strategy unfolds, the Army
faces three possible futures. One is to preserve something like a smaller version of the
current force. The emphasis would remain on preparing for conventional war, building
partner capacity, and, to a lesser extent, fighting nonstate enemies. The diminution of
capacity without an equivalent diminution in tasks or missions would simply increase the

risk the Army confronts. A second option would be a redesigned Army with the entire
force taking on the attributes of the Special Forces. It would concentrate on “small
footprint” operations against nonstate opponents, perhaps with the Reserve Component
providing the mobilization capability if the United States becomes involved in a major
war. The third option would be a reserve-based Army with a small active force to
spearhead mobilization in case of national emergency.
Unfortunately, the Army cannot simply wait for the national debate on the future of
American strategy to finish before moving out. Instead, the Army’s leaders have to guess
how policymakers will use Landpower in the coming decade. They may guess wrong, but
there are no alternatives. The best that the Army’s strategic thinkers can do is actively
participate in the ongoing debate and be ready to redirect or refocus the service’s
evolution once a new consensus on America’s world role takes shape.
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